Op-Ed: The Houthis' Ambitions Are Not Yet Blunted

 

For the shipping community, the Red Sea route between the West and East using the Suez Canal remains a dangerous choice. Attempts at the beginning of July to test the viability of the passage ended in the loss of two Greek-owned bulk carriers, Magic Seas (IMO 9736169) and the Eternity C (IMO: 9588249), with multiple fatalities. Shipowners have been forced to revisit their calculations, though many remain willing to take the risks.

The Houthis are the only members of Iran’s original Axis of Resistance whose fighting spirit appears to remain undiminished. Although it was a Houthi initiative to propose the May 6 ceasefire with the United States, the Houthis did so in search of a tactical pause in which to recover from significant losses inflicted by both American and Israeli airstrikes, not as an act of surrender. The Houthis have frequently used ceasefires in the past as an opportunity to regroup. Consistent with this, Houthi missile and drone strikes against Israel have continued, albeit at reduced levels. The aggressive rhetoric has also continued.

Given then that the Houthis are still standing as a fighting force and their determination to fight Israel over Palestine is undiminished, how is the Houthi threat to shipping likely to evolve? Is the Red Sea route likely to reopen to shipping anytime soon?

The Houthis may not have it all their own way of course. While the United States appears to have pulled back from confronting the Houthis, Israel has been urging the United States to re-engage, but faces opposition from within the wing of the Republican Party that seeks to avoid overseas confrontations. Israel itself, not previously having given the Houthis a high priority, are clearly now re-evaluating the threat, particularly having achieved dominance elsewhere. The use of drones to suppress Houthi activity from afar may signal a new surveillance-led approach to tackling the Houthi threat that is likely to get more and more effective as the Israeli intelligence services improve their understanding of Houthi military structures. As used in the context of Iran, Israel has a Mizrahi community which it can leverage to achieve high-level understanding and penetration of the target environment. Certainly, looking at previous attempts to take down Houthi military effectiveness, a new approach and a new level of determination will be necessary if military means are to be successful.

Within Yemen, the Houthis’ political position for the moment remains strong. The Houthis, once confined to the north-west, have successfully formed broader tribal and political alliances, then consolidated these allies into their core structure. With Iranian assistance, they have developed a highly effective security structure able to identify and quickly suppress dissent. The surveillance and counter-intelligence equipment intercepted by National Resistance Forces en route to the Houthis on June 27 are worthy of the most sophisticated internal security organization; that the Houthis managed to procure such equipment from leading edge Israeli and Western sources is highly impressive of itself, and indicative of the caliber of the Houthi internal security apparatus.

Forces theoretically loyal to the recognized government of Yemen pose little threat to the Houthis. Most of the Yemeni anti-Houthi warlords are concerned primarily with securing personal economic benefits from foreign backers, and these sponsors have little interest in burying their differences so as to achieve a reunified Yemen. The viability of the recognized government as an alternative to the Houthis expired several years ago, if it ever existed, and what unity of purpose there was appears to be fraying. This is evident on the ground, where the front line between the Houthis and their adversaries has barely changed in years.

If there is a dynamic and a potential for change in Yemen, putting aside change that an Israeli initiative might engender, it is that the Houthis ideologically are still on the advance, their enthusiasm for taking the war to Israel over the Palestinian cause boosted by popular Arab support. The Houthis are reveling in being now the only active member of what was the Axis of Resistance, and of being the vanguard of populist anti-Israeli views quietly curbed within the Arab monarchies. So it is not inconceivable that the Houthis will attempt more ambitious anti-Israeli actions than hitherto. Western nations generally, and in particular the United States and Britain, are regarded as targets by association.

In the short term, Houthi drone and missile attacks on Israel will continue, as will attacks on targets of opportunity should they present themselves in the Red Sea or further afield. Indeed the Yemeni military spokesman Brigadier Yahya Sare’e on July 27 threatened such an expansion of Houthi anti-shipping activities.  But in the longer term, ambitious new attack options are likely to be pursued. Brigadier Bakil Saleh al Wahbi, commander of a Houthi-allied tribal force in the Al Bayda region, has warned that ‘upcoming military options will be painful for Israel and its allies’, and that the closing the Bab al-Mandeb Strait is on the table if the war on Gaza continues.

Reports continue to suggest that the Houthis are supporting Al Shabab operations on the western side of the Red Sea, threatening the Mogadishu government and the East African littoral. The popular center-right newspaper Israel Hayom has published a report that the Houthis have graduated a third batch of ‘special force’ soldiers for their Tufan al-Aqsa unit, trained to launch raids into Israel. Any such raid would require some innovative thinking - but the Houthis have proved resourceful in coming up with new attack options.

There is a gap between such aspirations and a realistic threat, but suffice to say Houthi ambitions are not yet blunted, and nor is their tactical ingenuity. The Houthis generate considerable support domestically with their pro-Palestinian stance, and as yet nothing has persuaded them to adopt a less aggressive posture. A ceasefire over Gaza is unlikely to satisfy the Houthis or quell their enthusiasm, and they need that aspirational cause to shore up their political base. The maritime community meanwhile has adapted to the risks of plying the Red Sea, and it looks for the foreseeable future as if greater use of routes around the Cape makes a sound commercial and practical alternative.