Op-Ed: Next Two Months are Critical for Stability in the Mideast

 

The next two months look set to be critical for world stability, offering the prospect of resolution of two global security issues that have caused conflicts and problems for decades. The two issues are linked, and neither looks likely to be solved in isolation.

A 60-day ceasefire in Gaza leading to negotiations for a permanent settlement is on the table, from which Israel needs an end to threats to its national security and Palestinians seek a broader solution to their quest for statehood. At the same time, the United States hopes to continue the negotiations over nuclear issues and regional expansionism with Iran. Even limited success in either of these two negotiations could have far-reaching impacts on global trade, opening up the prospect of economic cooperation across what were once barriers, the development of new markets, and the establishment of previously impossible trading routes. Success might even provide momentum for a resolution of the war in Ukraine as well.

But while hopes are high that settlements can be achieved, there is significant risk that the conflict with Iran in particular could flare up again.

Notwithstanding the combined attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, there can be no certainty that Iran has lost the ability to produce a crude nuclear weapon, since it may still have stocks of already-enriched uranium and hidden manufacturing facilities that survived. Hardliners in Iran are pressing for an acceleration of their nuclear program.

Iran retains a formidable stockpile of ballistic missiles. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has claimed that half of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers have been destroyed. Of a stockpile of about 3,000 ballistic missiles, Iran managed to fire 500 missiles and Israel destroyed a further 1,000, leaving an estimated inventory of 1,500.

Iran also improved ballistic missile accuracy as the war progressed, having initially kept more advanced systems like the Haj Qassem in reserve. At peak, 16% of Iranian missiles penetrated Israeli air defenses. Five military and 36 civilian targets in Israel were hit over the 12 days - never at sufficient tempo to suppress Israeli military activity, but a significant result nonetheless.

This limited Iranian success and the remaining missile inventory indicate that if war were resumed, the residual Iranian ballistic missile capability would pose a problem. Israeli attacks on Iran also suggest that the Iranian missile armory was larger than had been generally appreciated outside intelligence circles. About 25 Iranian missile sites had been identified in open source listings before the conflict began. But with Israeli bloggers and Ministry of Defense reveals of attacks on previously unknown sites, the Iranians seem to have been maintaining at least 36 such sites, of which the Israelis are known to have attacked at least 26.

Known IRGC Ballistic Missile Sites unmasked by the 12-Day War (CJRC)

CLUSTER	LOCATION/SITE	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	HIT	NEWLY LOCATED
Abhar (independent site?)		36.086210N	49.227040E	ü	ü
Bandar Abbas Area Independent Sites	Bandar Abbas Khorgu	27.528789N	56.451021E
	Haji Abad	28.328772N	55.942649E
	Bandar Lengeh	26.658735N	54.893197E
	Lar	27.643131N	54.256253E
	Jam/Bandar Kangam	27.794144N	52.318042E
Borujerd (independent site?)		33.945160N	48.603120E	ü
Dezful Cluster	Dezful North	32.614819N	48.331450E	ü	ü
	Dezful South	32.607790N	48.323210E		ü
Garmdareh Cluster	Garmdareh NW	35.788410N	51.059026E
	Garmdareh NE	35.768729N	51.085032E
	Eshtehard Missile Depot	35.679399N	50.434855E	ü	ü
Isfahan Cluster	Isfahan West	32.695027N	51.430270E	ü
	Isfahan South/Baharestan	32.459346N	51.714619E
	Mobarakeh	32.342160N	51.664470E	ü	ü
Kangavar (independent site?)		34.439340N	47.877860E	ü	ü
Kashan (independent site?)		34.093362N	51.255711E	ü
Kerman (independent site?)		30.239153N	56.851713E
Kermanshah Cluster	Panj Peleh/Bakhtaran	34.360500N	47.228508E	ü
	Konesh Canyon	34.389521N	47.181043E
	Kermanshah South	34.394788N	47.222654E
	Kermanshah NE	34.525045N	47.361183E
	Kermanshah NW	34.439950N	47.187934E
	Ghazanchi	34.479430N	47.015580E	ü	ü
	Kamijeh	34.522583N	47.362406E	ü	ü
Khorramabad Cluster	Khorramabad Imam Ali NW	33.581276N	48.181536E	ü
	Khorramabad Imam Ali SE	33.564324N	48.217238E
	Khorramabad Imam Ali Main	33.552360N	48.214160E	ü	ü
Qom (independent site?)		34.943853N	50.763649E	ü
Shiraz Cluster	Shiraz NW	29.726310N	52.558080E	ü
	Shiraz North	29.707720N	52.590671E	ü
Tabriz Cluster	Tabriz North/Ammnad	38.251449N	46.119187E	ü
	Tabriz South	37.977313N	46.176606E
Yazd (independent site?)		31.802441N	54.295549E
Zanjan (independent site?)		36.746500N	48.435190E	ü	ü

 

One can conclude that Iran appears to have sufficient residual capability to resume a missile war if hardliners within the Iranian political leadership get their way. To this threat must be added the risk of a closure of the Straits of Hormuz, for which the Iranians have made some military preparations by training for the task and forward-deploying stocks.

The Iranians may have the capability to resume warfare. But they now also know that Israel has both proven political will and intent - as well as the capability - to attack again if it perceives its national security to be under threat.