Are the Houthis Suppressed as a Red Sea Threat?

 

With the Iranian regime attempting to recover from significant damage caused by Israeli and American attacks in June, the question remains whether the Houthi rebels have the capability to cause further disruption in the Red Sea - and whether or not they have the intention of using it.

On the surface, the Houthi’s belligerent intentions remain undiminished. The chief Houthi military spokesman Brigadier Yahya Sari’e continues to issues threats: immediately after the American attack on Iran on June 22, he warned that Israeli and American ships should keep out of Yemeni waters, and said that Yemen would officially enter the war against Israel and the United States. On June 24, firebrand Houthi political spokesman Mohammed Al Bukhaiti declared that the Houthis were not bound by the US-Iranian ceasefire and would continue operations against Israel until a ceasefire is achieved in Gaza.

Nonetheless, the Houthis remained on the sidelines of the war that Israel launched against Iran earlier this month, sending a few missiles into Israel but otherwise largely holding fire and observing their previously agreed ceasefire with the United States. The Trump administration in May halted a two-month-long bombing campaign against the Houthis, saying they had agreed to stop their campaign against Red Sea shipping launched in response to Israel's war in Gaza.

No such attacks have been mounted by the Houthis against shipping in the Red Sea, though the Houthi have continued to launch occasional drone and missile attacks against Israel - all of which as singleton attacks appear to have been intercepted. So while the rhetoric is still belligerent, actions on the ground suggest a dialing-back of hostile activity.

One reason for this is undoubtedly the direct impact of US and Israeli attacks on Houthi targets in Yemen, which destroyed stocks of missiles, drones and launching equipment - damage which encouraged the Houthis to seek a ceasefire. The Houthis will thus need to regenerate capability. But they are evidently still reliant for critical missile and drone sub-systems on supply from Iran, based on the nature of technology seized on boats smuggling cargos from Iran to the Houthis.

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National Resistance Forces in Mocha unload missile and drone components intercepted en route to the Houthis (courtesy NRF)

This supply too will have been disrupted during the 12-Day War on Iran. Then on March 17 and April 29, US and British attacked two factories controlled by Hubayshi Steel, which are likely key to the Houthi’s stand-alone capability to self-manufacture less sophisticated missile and drone hardware.

Politically, the Houthis have also been damaged. Iran has failed to stand by the Houthis, and in Houthi eyes it has let down the Palestinian cause by holding back support at critical moments in the Gaza campaign. At times, the Houthis must have felt that they were the only members of the Axis of Resistance who were still resisting, and that the considerable sacrifices they were making for the cause were neither useful nor appreciated. Not only was the Houthi leadership directly targeted by Israeli attacks, but through Israeli damage to Houthi-controlled ports at Hodeida, Ras Isa and Salif, they also lost much of their ability to earn customs revenues, on which regime security efforts depend.

Moreover, the Houthis now fear that Israel will switch its focus to achieving the same degree of penetration of their own leadership structure in Yemen as the Israelis managed to achieve in Iran - and arguably, faction-riven Yemen is more vulnerable to such intelligence operations than Iran is and was. Israeli Minister of Defense Israel Katz indeed has so threatened.

These stresses and strains are reflected in domestic Yemeni politics - in which the Houthi grip on power is not as secure as it can appear to the outside observer, and where rifts can lead to switches of allegiance.

There have been tensions within the Houthi leadership over responses to recent setbacks. But sensing weakness, there have also been attempts by forces loosely aligned to the recognized government to capitalize on the new situation. Saudi-backed Emergency Forces in Taiz led by Brigadier Abdullah Al Hamzi, and Protection Forces in the Hadramawt have both been recently reorganized and refunded.

The Emirati-backed National Resistance Forces commanded by Major General Tariq Abdullah Saleh (left) on the southern Red Sea coast have also been reinforced. The interim government has also at last acted against the supposedly loyal Brigadier Amjad Khaled, who in reality was working with the Houthis to target Southern Transition Council forces sponsored by the UAE in Aden and Lahej provinces.

This chaotic response within the recognized government coalition to the supposed weakness within Houthi ranks suggests there has been no decisive swing in the balance of power between the warring factions in Yemen. Both sides have their weaknesses. With the externally-sponsored divisions within the interim government as destructive as ever, the more rigorously organized Houthis will be gifted the time and space to recover - but that does not mean that they will necessarily have the capacity to renew external operations in the short term, or until links with Iran can be restored.

Lurking in the background, the Houthis now also know that both Israel and America have the political determination to go after them should they step out of line. Indeed, while the Houthis remain a long-term threat, Israel in particular is probably looking for an excuse to renew their offensive against the Houthis so as to degrade that threat on a permanent basis. The unfortunate conclusion therefore is that the Houthis are down but not out, and given the lack of effective opposition to them within Yemen itself, they will recover in time their enthusiasm for threatening both Israel and shipping in the Red Sea. Shipping insurers and owners will rightly continue to be wary of Red Sea passages.