Making UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Work:

Governments Should Not Overlook Third-Party Commercial Help in Stopping WMD Proliferation. Commercial activity and equipment of trusted third-party providers should not be overlooked by governments when taking stock of their internal efforts to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Adopted in April, 2004, Resolution 1540 established for the first time binding obligations on all UN member states to take and enforce effective measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ("WMD"),their means of delivery and related materials. The Resolution obliges member states to prohibit support to non-state actors seeking WMD; to enact effective laws prohibiting WMD proliferation to non-State actors; to apply effective measures to control WMD-related items and related funds or services; and to provide periodic reports to the UN Security Council on implementation efforts. Assistance to governments in implementing the Resolution may be available in certain circumstances through (for example) "1540 Coordinators" designated by governments with resources and expertise to share. On the whole, the Resolution provides no explicit "yardstick" to measure compliance. But its importance has been underscored repeatedly since adoption, and in July, 2009, world leaders like Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev identified compliance as a joint priority. It is therefore, when looking at securing the supply chain, increasingly important for governments to bear in mind the commercial activities of trusted third-party providers, like Cotecna, when formulating strategies to implement such a Resolution - particularly in nations that lack the resources of Europe or North America for broad implementation efforts. These activities should be factored into Resolution 1540 compliance reports, but their direct relevance to compliance efforts is often underappreciated or overlooked. The value added that trusted third-party providers of inspection services at a nation's border crossings and ports can bring is indisputable, but it is not immediately evident. "Inspection" under the ISO 17020 standard definition includes: "Examination of a product design, product, service, process or plant, and determination of . conformity with specific requirements or, on the basis of professional judgement, general requirements". Indeed, in our experience, many governments may already be employing such inspection services in their ports or at their borders. However, governments and trade-oriented regional or global international organizations typically may not perceive the clear value of inspection services in relation to WMD counter-proliferation efforts and national responsibilities. And therein lies the key point; that equipment and technology currently used around the world today to inspect and scan containers and cargo vehicles for revenue protection or to combat conventional smuggling, also provide a valuable platform for countering WMD proliferation. In addition to careful and expert imaging, such equipment configurations and operational processes may be easily modified to include radiological and explosive detection in the work flow, in this way providing deeper layers of defense against proliferators. The WMD counter-proliferation benefits of container, cargo and vehicle inspection and scanning can operations flow from both more costly fixed scanner installations at major port and border crossings and less costly mobile scanners. Each type of equipment has unique benefits. Risk management-based random or targeted use of either variety of scanner will significantly deter WMD proliferators at ports of entry, at interior customs terminals, at rail/truck transshipment and consolidation points, in free trade zones, at airports, at large warehouses, and in other logistical venues. Scanners increasingly are being considered by forward-looking law enforcement agencies. Governments and international trade organizations may fail to appreciate the value that customs risk management databases can bring to the task of preventing WMD proliferation. A well managed, mature and populated database, with information about shippers, consignees, carriers, cargo, and other trade-related information, can provide substantial support for the counter-proliferation mission to responsible officials in the operating country by helping to identify actors or events of concern in the supply chain. Governments would significantly benefit from using customs risk management technology to support and control compliance with Resolution 1540. Other types of inspection services, particularly destination and pre-shipment inspection and verification of conformity, are also underappreciated tools in the counter-proliferation toolbox. Governments currently using such services should consider their value to meeting obligations imposed by this Resolution and other international undertakings related to WMD. Today in many nations, inspections prior to shipment or on arrival detect over-invoicing to prevent unjustified transfer of foreign exchange abroad, determine the classification and valuation of goods, and ensure the correct collection of import duties and taxes. In addition to combating capital flight and collecting extra customs duties, these inspections should also be seen as key measures to combat WMD proliferation. If coupled with basic training in recognition of WMD-related material, inspectors working for trusted third parties can become important "force-multipliers" against illegal proliferators. This activity should be counted together with other efforts to comply with the Resolution. Transit monitoring and cargo tracking systems are also relevant in the Resolution compliance context. These are innovative electronic tools used to monitor remotely the movement of vehicles transporting goods in transit, developed to reinforce the capacity of customs services to control international and inland transit, and fight efficiently against fraud while facilitating trade. This technology's relevance to preventing diversions of shipments for WMD proliferation purposes is obvious. Where it is in use, however, experience shows that it is overlooked as a measure of counter-proliferation preparedness. One of the primary obligations which Resolution 1540 imposes upon UN member states is to take and enforce effective measures to control WMD-related items in order to prevent their proliferation. It is interesting to note that many nations which employ the trusted third party inspection services described here have not perceived the importance of these services to their obligations under the Resolution. This must change. Likewise, nations where such services are not in use should consider them as effective and (perhaps equally important) affordable measures that could be employed to meet UN member obligations to implement the Resolution. At the same time, such services would add significant value in the areas of trade facilitation, defense against revenue leakage, and interdiction of illegal non-WMD related smuggling (e.g., small arms and narcotics). It is not necessary to have the resources of Europe or North America to play a responsible and effective role in the important work of preventing WMD proliferation. Rather, nations should take a close look at capabilities which may already be available to them given their relationships with trusted third party providers. Often there is more there than meets the eye, and a thorough assessment of such inspection capabilities generally will reveal opportunities to implement the Resolution without the burden of massive additional investments. Such inspection services are already widespread in the most challenging trade environments. What we have sought to do at Cotecna is to offer a pioneering and innovative program of well-founded advice and expertise on using commercial inspection and scanning services to advance Resolution 1540 compliance. Given justifiable concern over the potential intersection between terrorism and WMD proliferation, these valuable commercial services, being performed today worldwide by ourselves and other trusted service providers, should be appreciated in a new light: they are necessary tools to facilitate efficient and safe trade, and critical force multipliers to prevent legitimate trade from exploitation and inadvertent complicity in the spread of WMD technology and contraband. • About Richard Douglas: Richard J. Douglas is Cotecna Inc.’s Vice President for Business Development and Corporate Relations. He leads Cotecna’s worldwide consultancy on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and other measures to protect the global supply chain from proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. He has served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter-proliferation, where he had policy responsibility for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. He is a lawyer and former nuclear submarine crewman. Reach him at [email protected] in Washington.